Recent advances in omics technologies provide the leverage for the emergence of precision medicine aiming at personalizing therapy to patient. In this undertaking, computational methods play a central role for assisting physicians in their clinical decision making by combining data analysis and systems biology modelling. Complex diseases such as cancer or diabetes arise from the intricate interplay of various biological molecules. Therefore assessing drug eciency involves studying the eects of elementary perturbations caused by diseases on relevant biological networks.
Introduction
The analysis of the patient omics prole (genome, metabolome, proteome, etc.) would become a standard for molecular based diagnosis and treatment tailored to patient by contrast to a one-size-ts-all strategy based on a oneto-one correspondence between disease and drug [18, 27] . Precision medicine is an emerging branch of medicine based on omics analysis aiming at improving clinical decision-making by designing new tools for the customization of therapies and their risk/benet assessment. Addressing this challenge puts the focus on the causality study of the pathogenesis at molecular level.
However, the relationship between genomic information and disease phenotype remains elusive. Indeed, a disease phenotype is rarely a consequence of an abnormality in a single gene product but involves complex interplays of various biological molecules [4] . For instance, patients with sickle cell anemia, which is caused by a unique well-dened mutation in a single gene (classic Mendelian disease) can exhibit highly variable phenotypes in the clinic [2, 36] . This variability is due to the interaction of the mutated gene with other individual-dependant genetic variants [37, 36] . Therefore, understanding the pathogenesis at molecular level requires to conceive frameworks facilitating the discovery of causes altering the molecular systems of a living organism. This challenge logically focuses on biological networks modelling the causal interplays of molecules [12] .
The main approaches in this eld study the location of dysfunctional molecules in networks and on the nature of network alterations leading to disease.
The works [3, 4, 19] study the formation of specic subnetworks, called module delineating the disease propagation. The hypothesis motivating the approach is that modules are considered as plausible support of integrated molecular function [26, 11] . Besides some evidences, [33] conrm the fact that proteins involved in the same disease have a high propensity to interact forming a tightly interconnected entity in the interactome. Thereby, disease should likely alter a functional module or being themselves modules supporting a dys-functionality (disease modules).
In [51] , a network-perturbation approach is used to explain molecular dysfunctions underlying human disease. The mutations causing genetic defects are expressed as actions on edges and nodes of the interactome. Schematically, a mutation leading to inoperative protein is modelled by a node deletion while mutations inducing loss or gain of interaction are respectively modelled by an edge deletion or addition (edgetic perturbation). They uncovered experimental and computational evidences that these network alterations occur in human Mendelian diseases.
It is worth noting that the perturbation on networks induced by diseases are formalized by elementary topological modications: nodes or edges are added or cut. Hence the complexity of disease relies on the impact of these topological modications on the biological processes aecting their evolution.
For example, cancer cells acquire the capability to sustain proliferative signalling notably by defecting feedback loops that hamper the regulation of the cell division [20] . Therefore, a deeper understanding of disease/therapy mechanism requires to enforce the prediction capabilities on the incidence of these elementary actions in the underlying dynamics of networks.
In this paper, we combine two theoretical frameworks: game theory and discrete models of dynamics (Boolean networks) to determine the best drug to administrate to a patient. The clinical decision-making is modeled using game theory, that denes the process of selection by the players of an action among alternative possibilities [32, 9] , while Boolean networks are used for modelling the eects of the interplay between disease and drugs on the patient molecular system. Boolean networks are used in biology to study the dynamics of molecular networks (modeled as interaction graphs), which represent functional interactions between molecules [43, 10, 1] . Such a dynamics evolves towards equilibria interpreted at the molecular level as the patient health condition or illness. The physician and the disease are considered as players of a game, each of them having strategies of action that correspond to a drug administration and to a genetic mutation, respectively. In a game, combinations of strategies, called strategy proles, modify the patient interaction graph, therefore modifying the associated Boolean dynamics and its equilibria. From the assessment of biomarkers at these equilibria, players' preferences are determined, and then, the interpretation of the ordinal Nash equilibrium leads to the discovery of the best physician action (drug). 
Network action game
We rst introduce the two models composing the network action game framework: Boolean networks and ordinal game theory then show their coupling.
Boolean networks
A Boolean network is a discrete dynamical system of a population of agents dened by a family of propositional formulas determining the evolution of the agents. The dynamics is dened by a transition system where Boolean vectors represent the possible states of the agents and transitions represent their evolution.
Let A be a set of agents. A (Boolean) state of a ∈ A is dened as a mapping s : A → B associating to an agent in A a value from B.
Let F = (f a ) a∈A be a family of propositional formulas, each f a dening the updated state of a depending on the states of other agents (seen as A state s is an equilibrium for −→, if it may be reached innitely often, i.e., ∀s ∈ S : s −→ * s =⇒ s −→ * s, where −→ * denotes the reexive and transitive closure −→. We denote by E −→ the set of all equilibria of −→. An attractor is a set of equilibria that are mutually reachable and a steady state is an attractor of cardinality 1. In Figure 2 , the states (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0)
are steady states.
Ordinal game
An ordinal game models strategic decision-making based on the denition of apreference relationamongst combination of players' strategies . Each player has a set of possible strategies and a strategy prole represents a partic-1 Asynchronous means that the state of at most one agent is updated at each transition. • P is a set of players;
• for each player p ∈ P , C p is a non-empty set of strategies c p of player p.
The set C P = C p 1 × . . . × C p |P | represents the set of all strategy proles;
• for each player p ∈ P , the relation p : C P × C P is a transitive and reexive relation (pre-order) on strategy proles called preference relation of player p.
In the sequel, we denote by c −p the strategy prole c restricted to strategies of players in P \ {p}. For each player, the preference relation is restricted to strategy proles where only his/her own strategy may dier:
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The solution concept of an ordinal game is an ordinal Nash equilibrium, namely a strategy prole c * such that by considering the opponents' choices, a player may only deviate into another Nash equilibrium. In the prisonner's dilemma example, such strategy prole corresponds to (B,B) where the prisonners betray each other (highlighted in grey in Figure 2 .2).
The ordinal Nash equilibria may form a cluster of strategy proles where the preference of the players changes to reach another strategy prole inside the cluster. Such situation may represent an absence of consensus (i.e., a single strategy prole) amongst a subset of players choices. Hence, by considering the global preference relation ( = p∈P p * ), the ordinal Nash equilibria are equivalent in the cluster. Formally, a strategy prole c * ∈ C P is an ordinal Nash equilibrium if: ∀c ∈ C P : c c * ⇐⇒ c * c. In [34] , the authors propose a computational denition of the ordinal Nash equilibrium as the strategy proles belonging to a terminal strongly connected component of a graph corresponding to the union of the preferences of players.
Network action game
Our framework, called network action game, denes an ordinal game complying to two founding principles:
First, each strategy prole c ∈ C P is associated to a Boolean network A, F c giving rise to the unique dynamics (S, −→ c ) and its set of equilibria E −→c . The preference relation p between strategy proles c and c , for each player p, is deduced from an assessment of these equilibria. More precisely, p is dened from a pre-order p on sets of equilibria E −→c and E −→ c , as follows:
The second principle is directly related to the biological network perturbation scheme mentioned in the introduction. Actually, the eect of a strategy prole c is instantiated by an interaction graph structural modication involving arc addition and arc deletion as basic actions. They are interpreted as a functional modication of the Boolean network dening F c .
More precisely, the structural modication is implemented by the sole operation of deletion applied on a saturated Boolean network F = (f a ) a∈A . Its interaction graph G F = A, includes all the arcs inserted in order to instantiate structurally the strategy proles, i.e.,
where Ω c (a i a j ) is a predicate, which is true if arc a i a j is added by strategy prole c, and false if the arc is deleted. Arc addition is thus interpreted as maintaining the corresponding arc in the saturated Boolean
Example
The following example illustrates a typical use of the network action game. Let us consider a two-players network action game with the saturated Boolean network dened in (Figure 2) .
Each player has two strategies: a particular one, α for p 1 , β for p 2 and an identical one . Each strategy c p of player p is interpreted as a function assigning to each arc a positive or negative strength (cf., Table 1 ). They are used to assess whether arcs are removed or maintained. Thus, predicate Ω c is dened using the sum of the strengths assigned by players' strategies to the arcs: a positive sum indicates an addition of the arc, while a negative or null indicates a deletion. Formally, for each arc
Then, for each strategy prole c ∈ {( , ), (α, ), ( , β), (α, β)} we compute In order to compute the preferences p on strategy proles, see (2), we consider, for each player p ∈ P , a score function σ p on states in S. σ p 1 is dened here as the number of 1s in a state expressing p 1 's preference while σ p 2 is dened as the number of 0s in a state. Hence, if the maximum score on E −→c is less or equal than the minimum score on E −→ c , then we have c p c , meaning that player p prefers c to c. More precisely, with min σp of a set of states E ⊆ S dened as min σp (E) = min({σ p (s)|s ∈ E}), and analogously for max σp , we have: 
Network action game applied to best drug selection in breast cancer
In this section, after introducing the modeling principles, we describe a model of Breast Cancer (BC) and show the application of network action game to drug selection.
3 which is equivalent to the transitive reduction of the global preference relation. 10 
Modeling Principles
We consider a two-players network action game where the players are the Physician and the Disease whose respective strategies correspond to dierent subtypes of disease and drugs. Hence a strategy prole is a combination (Drug, Disease). Each of such proles acts on the patient by disrupting his interactome network and the disruptions are formally interpreted as addition or deletion of arcs [51] . Each strategy prole is thus associated to an interactome network whose dynamics is modeled by a Boolean network, The ( , )
strategy prole leads to the healthy Boolean network and corresponds to a situation where neither the Disease nor the Physician acts.
From a systems biology perspective, the cell phenotype arises from the interactome network [46] and a main assumption in Boolean network modeling is that the equilibria of the dynamics are representative of this phenotype [44] . We therefore assess the eects of the interactome disruption on the phenotype by considering the equilibria of the Boolean networks associated to each strategy prole. To assess the result of the prole actions to predict the eciency of a drug, a score is dened on the state of some molecules assimilated to biomarkers in Precision Medicine [27, 16] . By comparing the scores at the equilibria of the dynamics, we determine the preferences of the players on strategy proles.
Obviously, a drug is ecient when the disease has disappeared permanently. The appropriate therapy is selected by detecting proles, where the disease has no option but to prefer its disappearance under the action of the drug. Such proles correspond to (Drug, ), which are Ordinal Nash equilibria reecting a stable condition. Hence, the best association between a drug and a disease is given by a prole (Drug, Disease), from which Disease player prefers the Ordinal Nash equilibrium (Drug, ) and the Physician player has no incentive to modify the selected drug. Schematically, the eciency of an anticancer drug depends on its ability to impair the proliferation of tumoral cells [21, 35] and, from a Darwinian point-of-view, we can assume that a tumoral cell has an incentive in proliferating [6] . We therefore dene a score function on the biomarkers of cellular proliferation to assess the benets of drugs and breast cancer strategies for each player. These scores are opposite for both players: the worst for the disease is the best for the physician and vice versa.
Description of the
In the following, we describe the reconstruction of the healthy signalling network, the actions of drugs and BC subtypes, the saturated Boolean network and the score functions for each player.
Healthy signalling network
Based on the literature and the KEGG Database [23] , we reconstructed a healthy signaling network representing the control of a breast cell proliferation phenoytpe in response to stress. We focused on the p53 [17, 39] , PI3K/Akt [14, 38] and BRCA [49, 13] signalling because they are involved in cell proliferation control and are commonly associated with cancers. In this signalling network model, the dierent pathways collaborate to regulate the activation of two targets: Cyclin D1 and Bax which are respectively the regulator of the G1/S transition during mitosis [30] and a pro-apoptotic factor initiating apoptosis [15] . The interaction graph representing the 11 proteins and 14 interactions of this healthy signaling network is shown on Figure 6 . The PI3K/Akt pathway is a phosphorylation cascade that promotes cell cycle progression through the inactivation of GSK3β and prevents apoptosis through the activation of Bcl2, an inhibitor of Bax [8] . The PI3K/Akt pathway interacts with p53 signalling through the activation of its inhibitor Mdm2 [28] . In turn, p53 inhibits PI3K signalling through the activation of its inhibitor PTEN [41] , therefore forming a loop [25, 7] . p53 is also involved in the activation of apoptosis through direct activation of Bax transcription [45, 5] . BRCA1 increases Bax activation transcription through p53 activation [49, 29] . BRCA is also involved in cell cycle arrest at the G1/S checkpoint [29, 13] , this mechanism is modelled by an inhibition of CycD1 by BRCA1. Finally, PARP inhibition induces cell cycle arrest and enhances cell death in a p53-dependent manner [31] and this is modeled as PARP activation of Cyclin D1 and PARP inhibition of p53. Table 4 (for BC) and Table 3 (for the physician) in Appendix. Figure 6 details the interaction graph in health condition. The saturated interaction graph comprising all the possible interactions is shown on Figure 8 and the formulas of the saturated Boolean network for each protein are given in Table 2 of Appendix.
Actions of BC and drugs on the signalling network

Score functions on cell proliferation biomarkers
Cell proliferation can be considered as the balance between mitosis and apoptosis. Schematically, we can distinguish four proliferation phenotypes:
quiescence, dormancy, division and death. A dividing cell enters mitosis and inhibits apoptosis, a dying cell triggers apoptosis and stops mitosis, a quiescent cell undergo neither mitosis nor apoptosis and a dormant cell balance mitosis with apoptosis [40] . We dene the score functions for each player on the states of the Cyclin D1 and Bax that can be considered as biomarkers of these two cell processes [30, 47] . We assigned, to the player Disease, a maximal score when mitosis is active and apoptosis is inactive (the cancer cell is proliferating) and a minimal score when mitosis is inactive and apoptosis is active (the cell is dying). Conversely, the Physician has a maximal score when the cell dies and a minimal score when the cell divides.
As cancer cells in quiescent and dormant states are responsible for relapses occurring many years after the treatment and healing of the patient [40] , we dened intermediate and opposite scores for both players when the cell is in a quiescent or dormant phenotype. The scores for each player are given in Ola,BRCA ; Ta,ER ; highlighted in grey) to a strategy prole corresponding to its absence of action (Tra, ; Ola, ; Ta, respectively). BC is unable to discriminate between a healthy and a treated state with a disease in these situations and we therefore interpret them as the eciency of the drug.
Morevover, the physician does not change his strategy while on Tra,HER and Ta,ER or Ola,BRCA. Also notice that Tra, , Ola, , Ta, are Ordinal Nash equilibria, indicating a situation where the disease has permanently disappeared in presence of these drugs.
Therefore from the preference graph, we can conclude that Trastuzumab is ecient to heal HER cancer, Tamoxifen for ER cancer and Olaparib for BRCA1 cancer. These conclusions are conrmed by clinical practice since the associations described by these strategy proles are currently used in the clinic [21] . Hence, in this case, the network action game framework has inferred the best drug strategy selection for three types of dierent mutations causing BC without explicit knowledge on these associations.
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Conclusion
Network action game couples Boolean networks with game theory in order to predict the best therapy. Arc addition/deletion on the interactome is considered here as a paradigm of the causal explanation of disease and therapy prediction. The eciency of the framework has been assessed on breast cancer model. As a result we show that the proposed associations between drugs and malignant mutations exactly match to those found in literature.
Future prospects mainly concern the application of the network action game to drug re-purposing and design. The former investigates the repositioning of drugs to new indications leading to substantially reduce the duration and the cost of their development cycle since the necessary analysis of the molecules was already performed. This may be addressed by generalizing the method applied for breast cancer. Indeed, screening in-silico drug actions on arcs against disease ones may be realized by assessing the consequence on the dynamics from the evaluation of marker states. To be feasable, this approach requires to automatically characterize actions from data and knowledge on drugs and to get reliable and complete description of network encompassing all the actions on arcs. The computational challenge for the drug design is the inverse problem of the therapy prediction, where the eects described by states of markers are known but the causes dened as actions must be discovered. Hence the issue is to infer the necessary actions on a diseased network in order to bring the dynamics back to the health state. This approach needs also to deduce the requested properties of the molecules to design and to compare them to actions of known molecules. [22, 50] and the activation of PI3K by ERα that occurs in presence of E2 in ER-positive breast cancer cells [24, 42] 
